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 Within the realm of civilian control of the armed forces as a subset of civil-military 
relations, probably the most problematic issue is control of the intelligence services. This is due 
not only to the legacies of the prior, non-democratic regimes, in which the intelligence or 
security apparatus was a key element of control, and in which human rights abuses often were 
allowed, but also to the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and democracy. 
Democracy requires accountability of the governors to the governed, and transparency. 
Intelligence services, by contrast, must operate in secret to be effective, thus violating to some 
degree both accountability and transparency (also called oversight). While well-established 
democracies have developed mechanisms to deal with this dilemma, new democracies are still in 
the process of creating them.  
 Any discussion of control and intelligence is difficult for several reasons. First, the terms 
and concepts associated with intelligence are ambiguous and frequently controversial. Second, 
much about intelligence -- gathering, analysis, and dissemination -- is secret; knowledge is 
power and those who hold it want to keep it to themselves. Intelligence professionals are a 
special club even within their own militaries or civilian organizations, and deliberately minimize 
the knowledge outsiders have about them and their activities. Third, there is relatively little 
written about intelligence and democratization. What good material exists usually pertains to the 
established democracies such as Great Britain, France, and the United States, where the goal of 
research is to reiterate the need to control the intelligence apparatus lest it undermine democracy. 
This chapter describes the structures and processes involved in the intelligence function; 
analyzes the challenges of democratic control over intelligence organizations particularly in new 
democracies; and highlights the importance of intelligence as a profession in these countries. 
 As will be shown in this chapter, a small but notable number of countries have 
undertaken to reform their intelligence systems, and in doing so have generated a public debate 
over the functions and responsibilities of intelligence services in a democracy. The body of 
useful literature that addresses these concerns is limited but recently has begun to grow.1 
Consequently, the authors wrote the chapter with the intention to demythologize intelligence in 
new democracies by providing an introduction to some of the key issues involved in the 
structures and processes of intelligence operations. This chapter bridges two areas that are 
usually examined separately: democratization and intelligence studies. Those who research and 
write on democracy apparently are either unaware of the centrality, or unwilling to deal with the 
implications, of intelligence services in democratic consolidation. Those who are experts on 
intelligence have not dealt directly with the different forms government can take, at least not in 







Security Intelligence and the Counterintelligence State 
 
 In virtually all authoritarian regimes (including the former Soviet bloc), the intelligence 
apparatus was a key means for maintaining power. In those countries with military regimes, the 
intelligence services also came under direct military control. In others, with communist or 
socialist governments, the intelligence apparatus was a mix of military and civilian services. In 
both, however, the problems of reform are similar.  
 As Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant point out in their study of intelligence services 
in the post-communist states of central Europe, these governments are procedural democracies 
grafted onto societies that suffer from a lack of trust in state institutions in general, and 
intelligence organizations in particular. Reform in the intelligence sector has been difficult 
because of this pervasive public distrust of institutions, as well as the common problem of 
politicization of the bureaucracy, and the consequent lack of a corporate culture or tradition of 
public service. In addition, post-communist states in Europe, long dominated by the Soviet 
Union, have little experience in external threat assessment and prioritizing national security 
needs.2 Our research indicates that these impediments to intelligence sector reform are not 
unique to post-communist European nations, however, but are, with varying degrees of 
significance, fairly common to most new democracies emerging from an authoritarian past. 
In established, modern democracies such as the United States and Great Britain, national 
intelligence organizations exist for one primary purpose: to inform and support foreign policy 
decision-makers. In theory, these full-service intelligence organizations, both military and 
civilian, should function as information processing services for elected leaders. Their most 
essential role is to determine the capabilities and intentions of a nation’s adversaries, and warn of 
potential threats. In virtually all these organizations, particularly those military intelligence 
services dealing with strategic issues, the lion’s share of people and assets are focused on 
capability and threat assessment to support the development of plans and identify emerging 
issues that affect long-term planning and the strategic environment. Counterintelligence is a 
purely secondary mission in these services, whether military or civilian. Domestic security 
intelligence is primarily a “high policing” function, and in most modern democracies it is 
assigned to a separate civilian agency such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or 
the Security Service (MI5) in the United Kingdom. 
This was not the case in most authoritarian regimes, where the boundaries and functions 
of military intelligence and police organizations overlapped or became indistinguishable from 
each other. Because these authoritarian regimes were based on something other than democratic 
legitimacy exercised through free elections, they had to rely on security organizations to identify 
domestic opponents, neutralize opposition to the government, and seek through a variety of 
means, including control over media, to generate at least domestic apathy. In most cases, 
intelligence organizations provided these services. Precisely because of this heavy reliance and 
its centrality to power, the intelligence apparatus in most non-democratic states grew in size and 
influence, with the result that it was largely autonomous even within authoritarian regimes.3 In 
these countries, intelligence meant mainly counterintelligence or security intelligence.4 That is, 
its purpose was to protect the state’s secrets from outsiders, which meant anyone outside the 






that which had to be controlled was immense. While in most instances the intelligence service 
rhetorically linked internal opposition to putative foreign enemies, the overwhelming focus of 
the intelligence service in most countries was on domestic opposition, not other states.5 
In general, these security intelligence services functioned more as “political police” than 
domestic intelligence bureaus familiar to the older democracies, which are subject to a 
democratic process, and responsive to ministerial control and legislative and judicial oversight. 
As they accrued influence over time, the security intelligence organizations acquired greater 
autonomy from policymakers and became insulated from any type of legislative or judicial 
scrutiny. They tended to be responsive only to the regimes in power, and they derived their own 
powers and responsibilities directly from executive authority rather than through legal mandates. 
They inevitably gathered political intelligence on tremendous numbers of people, usually 
unrelated to specific criminal offenses. These security intelligence organizations were the means 
with which authoritarian regimes used to conduct aggressive countering operations against 
political opposition. In some cases, such as South Africa under President F.W. de Klerk, 
authoritarian intelligence services resembled what W.W. Keller and Peter Gill have called the 
“independent security state.” This extreme form of security intelligence organization is 
characterized by an almost total lack of external controls on intelligence activities. It differs from 
the political police in that the security intelligence organization determines its own agenda and 
goals, which may not coincide with those of the ruling elite. Its funding and policies remain 
hidden from the rest of the policymaking process, and the organization itself selects the targets 
for its information gathering and countering activities.6  
 
A Model for Comparative Analysis 
 
In his book, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, 
Peter Gill elaborates on the work of W. W. Keller by creating a model for the modern state and 
its intelligence security services, and forms a typology by which it is possible to classify and 
compare the services of different states.7 According to Gill, security intelligence services can be 
classified by the degree of power they posses, measured in the degree of autonomy from external 
political control and oversight they enjoy, and in the degree of their penetration of society. The 
classification of the services can then be used to draw some conclusions about the nature of the 
state. Gill groups security intelligence services in all types of political regimes, authoritarian and 
democratic, into three categories:  
• Bureau of Domestic Intelligence: This organization has limited and specific powers derived 
from a legal charter or statute. Its primary function is to gather information relating to the 
criminal prosecution of security offenses, and it does not conduct aggressive countering 
operations against citizens. The British MI5 is a good example of this type of security 
intelligence service. 
• Political Police:  These operatives have greater autonomy from democratic policy-making 
and are more insulated from legislative and judicial scrutiny than a bureau of domestic 
intelligence. This type of security intelligence service responds almost exclusively to the 
political elites or party in power. Typically, political police focus on internal political 
opposition groups, often gathering intelligence unrelated to specific criminal offenses, and 






existing regime. The security intelligence services in many authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America and Southeast Asia would fall into this category. 
• Independent Security State: This is a security intelligence service characterized by a lack of 
external controls and oversight, even from the authoritarian regime it is supposedly 
protecting. It differs from the political police because it determines its own goals, which may 
not coincide with those of the political elite. Enjoying a high degree of autonomy from the 
routine political process, this type of security intelligence service keeps its funding and 
policies hidden from the governmental policy-making process, and its targets and countering 
activities are authorized by the service itself, not elected officials. Examples of independent 
security states include the South African intelligence apparatus during periods of the de 
Klerk regime, and the Securitate in President Nicolae Ceaucescu’s Romania. 
Among these three general types of security intelligence services, the independent 
security state’s penetration of society is most extensive and it wields virtually unchecked power 
over the regime and population. Not only does it collect intelligence, but it also sets its own 
agenda and conducts countering operations independent of the ruling elite’s desires. The political 
police, by comparison, wield less power and are more responsive to the regime in power. The 
domestic intelligence bureau is the ideal type of security intelligence service for a democracy. It 
does not conduct countering operations against its citizens, and may not even have arrest 
authority, but its monitoring nevertheless remains a form of power, and thus potentially 
susceptible to political misuse.  
 
Figure 1: Gill’s Typology of Security Intelligence Agencies8 
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This model gives nine possible classifications for security intelligence services. Box A 
holds the independent security state. It is autonomous from the rest of the state and penetrates 
deeply into government institutions and society. On the other end of the spectrum, in box I, is the 
domestic intelligence bureau. It is subject to strong control by the rest of the state and does not 
penetrate far into government or society. In between the two extremes are the political police in 
box E. While the prospect of a service occupying boxes C or G seems low, it is conceivable to 
have a service that is highly autonomous yet exercises self-restraint, or one that is tightly 






Gill’s typology, while useful, suffers from its limited ability to compare and contrast 
relative changes in security intelligence agencies over time. Moreover, it labels only one-third of 
the possible combinations of agencies based on their autonomy from and penetration of society. 
A more accurate graphical depiction is shown below. While maintaining the three general 
categories developed by Keller and Gill, this graph can be used to rank and compare intelligence 
agencies by accounting for change in the independent variables of autonomy and penetration of 
society. 
 
Figure 2: Types of Security Intelligence Services 
 
      High     Independent Security State 
 













        Bureau of 
         Domestic Intelligence  
     
   Low                                                                                         High  
 
Penetration of Society 
 
 
A more accurate tool for comparative analysis among states and within states over time 
would be a pair of graphs showing the relative position of both states and their intelligence 
organizations. We maintain that there is a correlation between the type of security intelligence 
apparatus and the classification of state regimes, and that this relationship can be more easily 
compared in a graph rather than by simply using discrete boxes. Furthermore, rather than adopt 
Gill’s classification of regime types (polyarchical state, national security state, and garrison 
state), we prefer to use the more generally accepted classifications of democracy, authoritarian 







Figure 3: Regime Types  
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Perception of Internal Threat 
 
 
The citizens of a democracy enjoy the freedom to form and join organizations; the right 
to express themselves and their opinions; to vote and hold free and fair elections; to run for 
public office; to engage in political competition; to seek out alternative sources of information; 
and to rely on government policy-making institutions controlled by elected officials. 
Policymakers in a democracy must balance security needs with social welfare expectations by 
seeing to it that the military, police, and security intelligence organizations are subject to civilian 
control and oversight. The government itself is accountable to the institutions of a democracy. 
Consolidated democracies are likely to have as their main intelligence arm a bureau of domestic 
intelligence that comes under tight democratic control.  
Typically, authoritarian regimes are at best purely formal democracies. If the ruling cadre 
do maintain a façade of democratic institutions, the persistence of political conflict allows them 
to resort to emergency powers at will. Often in such situations, the regime’s legitimacy is at 
stake, civil rights are restricted, political conflict becomes militarized, and the security 
intelligence services are granted exceptional powers usually only applicable during a state of 
emergency or war. Most authoritarian regimes rely on political police for their security 
intelligence needs and to protect their regime from internal threats.  
Taken to its extreme form, an authoritarian regime may become so preoccupied with 
threats to its political power, both real and perceived, that it devolves into a totalitarian state 
where the military and security intelligence structures dominate political activity, opposition is 






intimidation and terror. As the ruling elites become increasingly paranoid about internal threats, 
they tend to cede more power to the security intelligence apparatus, leading to the eventual 
emergence of an independent security state.10 It stands to reason that an independent security 
state could not exist in a democracy. As governments become more concerned with internal 
threats, however, they tend to emphasize national security matters over social welfare policies. 
Emerging democracies, where the institutions of democracy are new and still primarily 
procedural, are particularly vulnerable to this devolution. 
The challenge of democratic consolidation and reform of the intelligence branch lies in 
the fact that in most countries there is little public awareness of intelligence functions and 
organizations. Most civilian politicians, let alone the public at large, do not know enough about 
intelligence to be able to have an informed opinion about it. In some countries there is justifiable 
concern that the intelligence apparatus was -- and is -- collecting  information that could be used 
against average civilians and politicians. Thus ignorance about intelligence communities is 
combined with fear, which perpetuates inadequate dissemination of information. From our work 
in several regions of the world, we have found that civilian politicians very often either do not 
know anything about intelligence, or, if they do, don’t want to deal with it. Since the intelligence 
services in these cases operate in secrecy, it is even more difficult to know just what they are 
doing. Given their historically negative impact on democratic legitimacy, however, it is unlikely 
that they are supporting democratic consolidation.  
 
The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation 
 
 “Consolidation” is a familiar concept in comparative politics, and is useful because it 
reflects the idea that a new regime’s structures and processes are becoming stable. That is, a 
democratic regime is consolidated when the elites and the masses accept it as “the only game in 
town,” and support its institutions.11 This acceptance is no easy task, especially if one considers 
the basic characteristics a regime must have to be termed democratic. The following is a brief 
standard definition of contemporary democracy: 
 
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held 
accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.12 
 
For accountability to function, procedural minimal conditions are necessary. As more 
countries began to consolidate their new democracies, it became apparent that some, such as 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, did not seem fully to empower the necessary institutions. Scholars 
identified a further defining characteristic of real functioning democracy, which is that no 
unelected body may have authority over the popularly elected officials. In all three of the 
procedural democracies above, the supervisory or monitoring role has been assumed by an 
unrepresentative body, such as a national security council or council of guardians, that has the 
power to veto legislation passed by the democratically elected legislature and executive. In 
Portugal at the beginning of the so-called “Third Wave of Democratization,” it should be noted 
that the Portugese constitution of 1976 empowered precisely such a body in the form of the 






1982, which eliminated this body and distributed its powers among the democratically derived 
sectors of government.  
 Newly elected leaders face major challenges both in the institutional lack of recent 
experience with democracy, and the inability of a wary population to value these new political 
structures and processes.13 Furthermore, the governments in most cases are confronting 
economic problems, often accompanied by social disruption. Overall, democracy is a very 
demanding political system both for elites and average citizens, and new democracies are highly 
tentative. The issue for newly elected leaders is how to develop trust and transparency while 
struggling with the legacies of the authoritarian regime.  
 The former regime’s intelligence apparatus is very unlikely to have come under 
government control, but instead either retains power over civilian officials or operates on its own 
agenda. This was clearly the case in Peru under President Alberto Fujimori, and in South Africa 
during periods of the de Klerk presidency. We expect that this remains an issue in a great many 
countries. If the elected government does not control the intelligence structures, it is by definition 
not a consolidated democracy, since democratic consolidation requires both the institutions and 
culture of democracy. Legitimacy is central to the culture of democracy. If a government is 
monitored -- more accurately,  blackmailed -- by the intelligence service, then the elected 
leaders’ claim to democratic legitimacy will be suspect and the citizens’ trust in the institutions 
of democracy will be damaged. Democratic consolidation is a huge challenge in the best of 
circumstances. Any handicap, especially one as critical as lack of legitimacy, can become an 
impediment impossible to overcome.  
 
 
The Meaning of Intelligence  
 
As we indicated earlier, intelligence organizations perform essential functions in a 
democracy, and arguably the most important function is informing the government of what it 
needs to know about external and internal threats. At this point, therefore, it is essential to define 
what we understand by intelligence. Due to the scope and diversity of intelligence activities, 
there is understandable disagreement about its meaning.14 As Mark Lowenthal points out, the 
term intelligence can have at least three meanings. It can be seen as a process, that is, the means 
by which governments request, collect, analyze and disseminate certain types of required 
information, and the rubric by which covert operations are planned and executed. Intelligence 
also comprises the products of these gathering, analysis and covert operations. Finally, 
intelligence can refer to the organization, that is, those agencies that carry out its functions.15 
Process -- the gathering and using of information for some purpose -- is the most salient of the 
three definitions for this discussion. Since processes vary, as do the sources and ultimate uses of 
information, much about them is of necessity vague. Those who become familiar with 
intelligence processes and their limitations are more likely to understand that not everything is 
knowable, let alone known.  
Most discussions within the intelligence community center on “tradecraft,” the “how to” 
of sources, methods and analysis, rather than the “what is.” The intelligence community’s 
obscure, exclusive character is cultivated intentionally, to prevent information from reaching 






from those very few of their superiors with a “need to know.” Given this chapter’s focus on the 
functions of intelligence in new democracies, we must adopt a broad definition of intelligence in 
order to convey the scope of what it can include.16 Glenn P. Hastedt, in his book Controlling 
Intelligence, states succinctly: “The four elements of intelligence are clandestine collection, 
analysis and estimates, covert action, and counter-intelligence.”17 Loch Johnson describes the 
interrelationship between these four functions, which is the focus of this section. 
 
Intelligence commonly encompasses two broad meanings. First, the secret 
agencies acquire and interpret information about threats and opportunities that 
confront the nation, in an imperfect attempt to reduce the gaps and ambiguities 
that plague open sources of knowledge about the world. A nation especially seeks 
secret information to help it prevail in times of war, with as few casualties as 
possible. Second, based on information derived from denied and open sources, 
policymakers call upon their intelligence agencies to shield the nation against 
harm (counterintelligence) while advancing its interests through the secret 
manipulation of foreign events and personalities (covert action).  Intelligence thus 
involves both information and response.18               
 
Most authors on the subject agree on the general functions of intelligence, and employ them in 
their functional models of intelligence systems.19 While these functions are common to most 
intelligence organizations, however, the ways in which they are distributed within the 
organization differs from state to state. 
For our purpose here, intelligence is understood to consist of the four functions described 
by Hastedt: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. Although the term also 
refers both to the organization collecting the information and the information collected, the 
information itself is not the defining characteristic. The key characteristics are that these 
functions are centered in and intended for the state and that they are secret. While we will briefly 
examine each of them individually, it is important to remember that they operate most effectively 
as parts of a process, in close conjunction with one another. As Roy Godson points out in the 
introduction to his book Intelligence and Policy: 
 
It is difficult to imagine an effective system for collecting intelligence without the 
analysis that provides effective guidance or “tasking” to collectors. 
Counterintelligence is necessary to protect collectors from becoming known, 
neutralized, and exploited by hostile intelligence services. Similarly, a successful 
program of covert action must be grounded in effective collection, analysis, and 
counterintelligence. All of this is to say that the nature of intelligence is such that 
the several elements of intelligence are parts of a single unified system, whose 
success depends on all parts working effectively. In short, it must be a “full-
service” intelligence system.20 
 
Collection 
 Intelligence organizations collect information. The questions and controversies that often 






employ to collect it. At a minimum, they use what today are termed “open sources,” which 
include periodicals, the Internet and Worldwide Web, and seminars and conferences -- any 
information available to the public. There is an ongoing debate regarding the relative value of 
open vs. classified sources, since so much information on so many topics is readily available 
nowadays through the public media.21 Collectors of intelligence further distinguish between 
human intelligence, or HUMINT, and scientific and technical intelligence, which includes signal 
intelligence, (SIGINT, from intercepts in electronic communications, radar, and telemetry), 
imagery intelligence, (IMINT, including air, satellite and ground imagery), and measurement and 
signatures intelligence, (MASINT, which is technically derived intelligence data other than 
imagery and SIGINT). HUMINT is information collected directly by people, including that 
provided by ambassadors or defense attaches as part of their normal reporting routines, 
information obtained at public and social events, and information garnered clandestinely through 
operatives, reading others’ mail and purloined documents. HUMINT is the traditional 
“espionage,” or spying, carried out mainly by agents placed in another country to provide secret 
information to their case officers, who then forward it to their home agencies.  
 
Analysis 
 Raw intelligence data is not much good without analysis. Analysis, or the anticipation of 
analysis, also shapes collection requirements. The difficulty at this stage lies not only in the need 
to process gigantic quantities of data, but even more in determining what conclusions to derive 
from the information. Production is only the first step; the intelligence must then be marketed. 
Analysis, in short, is not a simple technical issue but includes a choice of methods, and the 
perceptions and political preferences of both the providers and “customers.” Much of the 
analytical literature on intelligence operations in the United States and Soviet Union focuses 
precisely on whether, and to what extent, leaders use the information provided to them by their 
intelligence organizations.22 For our purposes of definition, then, analysis includes marketing the 
product to the decision-maker.  
From a national security point of view, timely, accurate intelligence can be a powerful 
tool and force multiplier. Every strategic plan is based on assumptions. Such assumptions, 
particularly those concerning the capabilities and intentions of a potential adversary, must be 
based on well thought-out intelligence estimates. The process of creating reliable, accurate 
strategic intelligence, however, is dynamic. This process, often referred to as the intelligence 
cycle, begins when the policy-maker and his planning staff -- in the United States, this will be 
the president and his National Security Council (NSC) staff -- express a need for intelligence 
information to help them make a national security-related policy decision. Intelligence managers 
-- in our example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the national level -- convert these 
requests into information collection plans. The raw data is gathered by various intelligence 
methods, processed and exploited, and given to analysts for integration, evaluation, and 
examination, that results in finished intelligence products (written reports or oral briefings, for 
example). These products are disseminated to the consumers (here the president and strategic 









 At its most basic level, the purpose of counterintelligence is to protect the state and its 
secrets against other states or organizations. Seemingly clear and straightforward in these terms, 
in fact it becomes, in the words of James Angleton, the long-time, often controversial head of 
counterintelligence at the CIA, “‘the wilderness of mirrors,’ where defectors are false, lies are 
truth, truth lies, and the reflections leave you dazzled and confused.”23 Abram N. Shulsky defines 
the scope of issues involved: 
 
In its most general terms, counterintelligence refers to information collected and 
analyzed, and activities undertaken, to protect a nation (including its own 
intelligence-related activities) against the actions of hostile intelligence services. 
Under this definition, the scope of counterintelligence is as broad as the scope of 
intelligence itself, since all manners of hostile intelligence activities must be 
defended against.24 
  
Shulsky, like most American authors on the subject of intelligence, associates 
counterintelligence primarily with countering foreign threats. In common usage, the term 
counterintelligence also is applied to those intelligence activities aimed at countering internal 
threats. British and Commonwealth scholars, however, prefer to use the term "security 
intelligence" to describe intelligence functions aimed at countering domestic threats. Gill defines 
security intelligence as "the state’s gathering of information about and attempts to counter 
perceived threats to its security deriving from espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, 
political violence, and subversion."25   
Memoir accounts by retired intelligence professionals, as well as books by students of 
intelligence, indicate that counterintelligence and security intelligence activities have the greatest 
negative implications for democracy, due to their covert surveillance of the citizenry.26 The 
implications for democracy are much more severe in new democracies where counterintelligence 
and security intelligence were the principal functions of intelligence services under the old 
regimes. The intelligence service sought to root out real and imagined enemies of the state, often 
resulting in yet more opposition, thus leading to a spiral of distrust and violence. If even in 
established democracies a certain amount of paranoia is inherent in counterintelligence and 
security intelligence -- as in “there is an enemy at work here and we must root him out” -- in less 
institutionalized and non-democratic Third World countries this attitude routinely resulted in 
extreme violations of human rights and impunity for the intelligence agents.27  
 
Covert Actions 
 Covert actions, or “special political actions” in Great Britain and “active measures” in the 
Soviet Union, are actions intended to influence another state by means that are not identified 
with the state behind the actions. There are several categories of covert action, ranging from 
propaganda to paramilitary operations. Mark Lowenthal categorizes them in terms of level of 
violence and degree of plausible deniability. The first level, propaganda, includes the utilization 
of the media in another country to convey a certain message. It is categorized as the least violent 






political activity, which includes funding or other support to the government leaders, political 
parties, unions, religious groups, the armed forces and the like in another country, to induce them 
to follow a certain course of action. Closely linked to this level is economic activity, in which 
governments use economic weapons, such as destroying crops, influencing markets, and 
circulating counterfeit currency, to destabilize a regime. The final two levels involve much 
higher degrees of violence and usually provide a lesser degree of plausible deniability. The 
overthrow of governments by coups, usually through surrogates (for example, the 11 September 
1973 coup in Chile led by General Augusto Pinochet) may be the final, less violent, method of 
clandestine regime change prior to paramilitary operations, which are the most violent covert 
action of all. This ultimate level involves the use of force, usually by means of indigenous armed 
elements, to launch a direct attack on the government of another state (such as the U.S.-backed 
Contra insurgency in Nicaragua during the 1980s).28 Paramilitary operations can range from 
smaller actions, like assassination, or arming and training a small contingent of dissident tribal 
groups, or they can be as large as the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The larger the 
paramilitary operation, the less likely it is provide the cover of plausible deniability for the 
sponsoring state. Richard Bissell, an American covert operations insider, has crafted a 
straightforward rationale for covert action: 
 
It becomes overwhelmingly obvious that we are deeply concerned with the 
internal affairs of other nations and that, insofar as we make any effort to 
encourage the evolution of the world community in accord with our values, we 
will be endeavoring purposefully to influence these affairs. The argument then 
turns out to be not about whether to influence the internal affairs of others, but 
about how…. Open diplomacy, however, has its limitations as a policy tool. There 
are times when a great power can best attain its objectives by acting in total 
secrecy.… On certain occasions, however, a great power may seek to influence 
the internal affairs of another nation without its knowledge or without the 
knowledge of the international community. These circumstances require covert 
action.29 
 
 Obviously, not every country has robust capabilities in all four intelligence functions, but 
the fact that some nations do have these capabilities means that this is the global framework 
within which intelligence must be understood. Intelligence is created to defend the state, within 
the context of potential enemies, other states and non-state actors, taking into consideration the 
instruments they have available. All countries are aware to some degree of the intelligence 
capabilities of other countries, and of the fact that they themselves will be involved in, or even 
the target of, data collection and covert action. 
 
Intelligence and Democracy 
 
 All countries have an intelligence apparatus of some scope and capability. The question 
for new democracies is, what kind of intelligence structure do they need and how can it be 
controlled? While the challenge is especially cogent in the new democracies, democratic control 






Holt states, “Secrecy is the enemy of democracy,” because secrecy encourages abuse.30  If there 
is secrecy how can there be accountability, the operative mechanism of democracy, especially 
when both the purveyors and end-users of secret information mutually benefit from the exclusion 
of oversight? Because intelligence organizations operate in secrecy, they largely avoid the 
checks and balances on which democracy is based. Second, intelligence agencies collect and 
analyze information, and information means power. High-level officials in intelligence 
organizations can leverage access to information to promote agendas and purposes of their own, 
including to benefit their “friends” in government, meaning those who will protect the 
organization’s prerogatives. Gill uses the metaphor of the “Gore-Tex” state to illustrate a high 
degree of domestic penetration by the security intelligence services. Information flows in one 
direction only: to the intelligence services, but not from them to state and society.31 Intelligence 
structures may be autonomous from state control and, through the use of information that others 
do not have, even determine state policy.  
 Third, intelligence agents and organizations routinely break laws abroad. Although 
spying is illegal everywhere, intelligence managers regularly provide undeclared funds to foreign 
nationals to act as agents and propagandists, tap phones, steal documents and the like, all of 
which are outside the law. In most such cases, operatives do not admit who they are or for whom 
they work. In such a culture, in which people are paid to operate outside the law with impunity, 
there may be a problem in making the distinction between breaking laws abroad and not 
breaking them at home. Fourth, intelligence officials can always invoke self-justification that 
their work is critical to the defense of the nation. In the words of Peter Wright, “[Intelligence] is 
a constant war, and you face a constantly shifting target.”32  It is up to the intelligence 
organizations to root out spies, domestic and foreign, who are threats to the nation. Their 
members may easily develop the perception that they know better than anyone else what is going 
on out there, and how dangerous the threat really is. The fact that they know things others do not, 
combined with their de facto license to operate outside society’s rules, may easily lead 
intelligence officials to develop a condescending, even adversarial, attitude toward anyone who 
is not initiated into the club.  
 
Critical Questions for Evaluating Intelligence Services 
 
In view of the difficulty states everywhere have in trying to control intelligence, and 
considering the dangerous legacy of intelligence services in most new democracies, what are the 
choices to be made concerning, and what are the implications of, different options for democratic 
control? This section lists the most important choices, and evaluates their likely impacts on 
democratic governance.  
To develop a model for comparative analysis regarding the relationship between the state 
and its intelligence services, several critical questions should be posed  Initially, and this 
requirement is the same for the armed forces in general, democracies must establish a clear and 
comprehensive legal framework for intelligence activities. Intelligence is “slippery,” and if the 
legal framework is not clear and explicit, intelligence agencies can never be brought under 
control. In Argentina, for example, long after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1983, 
the intelligence law remained a secret leftover from the old regime for almost another twenty 






legal framework for intelligence until 2000. Another, more encouraging example, is South 
Africa, where the government initiated legislative reform of the intelligence apparatus soon after 
the transition to majority rule in 1994. This involved three major bills in parliament, which 
together clearly defined and restructured the intelligence system.33 Brazil, like Argentina, took 
considerably longer to institute reforms after the transition to civilian government in 1985. It 
finally created the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) in 1999, to replace the authoritarian 
regime’s National Intelligence Service. Even so, it was not until September 2002 that President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso decreed into being the Brazilian Intelligence System, of which the 
ABIN was named the “central organ.” The Brazilian congress did play a key role in the final 
creation of ABIN, and the legislation provides a clear legal basis for civilian control of Brazil’s 
intelligence organs.  
 There are three fundamental decisions and several secondary decisions to be made 
regarding the establishment of civilian control over intelligence operations. These choices should 
be stipulated within a clear and explicit legal framework adopted by the government’s legislative 
body. The first choice is to determine which of the four intelligence functions will be 
implemented and how much of the country’s resources will be allocated to them. The initial part 
of the question can be answered only by assessing the global and regional situation, alliances, 
recent history, and capabilities. The latter part -- how much is intelligence worth? -- is a political 
decision. Obviously it is worth a great deal if it provides the nation with the means to maintain 
its independence in the face of a hostile neighbor. Intelligence also can be valuable in lieu of 
maintaining large military forces, by allowing a country to focus its capabilities on the most 
serious threats and thereby minimize redundancy and higher operational costs. But can the mere 
fact of having a certain level of intelligence capability serve to deter hostile intentions and 
actions? Much depends on the government’s relationship with other, more powerful countries 
that may be willing share intelligence with it under certain circumstances. These choices should 
be integrated into an overall framework for defense decision-making, based on an assessment of 
what the nation requires and how much it is willing to pay for it. This is, of course, an abiding 
issue in all civil-military relations.  
The empirical evidence clearly shows that the top level of the executive branch of 
government (the president or prime minister and relevant cabinet ministers) must take 
responsibility for making these decisions, and seeing that they are in synchrony with the rest of 
the defense apparatus. This raises the issue of how to structure the bureaucratic organization that 
manages or integrates the intelligence functions. In the United States, the director of Central 
Intelligence provides the integrated intelligence product, but it is the National Security Council 
that coordinates national policy. In Brazil after the most recent reforms, the Secretariat of 
Institutional Security has responsibility for coordination, working directly under the president. 
And since South Africa instituted its reforms in the mid-1990s, the National Intelligence Co-
ordinating Committee reports directly to the president and the cabinet on intelligence matters.  
 The second critical choice facing a new democratic government concerns the balance 
between civilian and military involvement in intelligence, in terms of both production (collection 
and analysis) and consumption. In most authoritarian countries, the military had a monopoly on 
intelligence as producer and end-user. During democratic consolidation, leaders must decide 
whether military intelligence should be replaced in whole or in part by new civilian 






intelligence, and have civilians assume responsibility for strategic intelligence and 
counterintelligence. The question of who will have access to the final “goods” is as important as 
that of collection. To whom will the intelligence product be distributed? Will access be limited to 
the president of the country, his director for intelligence, members of the cabinet such as Interior, 
or only to the military? Should members of congress be in the loop, or anyone else? Access to 
intelligence information, and the form in which it is made available, such as open or classified, 
written reports or oral briefings, has great implications for the potential power of those who 
receive it. In the 1996 Guatemala peace agreement, the “Accord on Strengthening of Civil Power 
and the Function of the Army in a Democratic Society” stipulates the creation of “a civil 
department of intelligence and analysis of information.” By April 2000, the Guatemalan 
government had defined the new structure, which included one military and two civilian 
intelligence organizations. The legislature subsequently adopted plans to form the Secretariat of 
Strategic Analysis, which will provide open-source collection and analysis directly to the 
president. Full implementation of these reforms was delayed, however, due to the failure of a 
referendum on constitutional revisions later in the same year, and as of February 2003, 
Guatemala’s leaders were still debating the future structure of a civilian intelligence system.  
 A sub-theme of this balance between civilian and military institutions is the issue of 
domestic and foreign intelligence. Does the same organization have responsibility for internal 
surveillance, which is mainly security intelligence, as well as external operations? Should these 
functions be fused, and if they are, what controls need to be in place so that operations and 
products are not used for political purposes? In most democracies the internal and external 
functions are separate. For example, the FBI handles counterintelligence and security 
intelligence within the United States, while the CIA has responsibility for intelligence gathering 
and counterintelligence outside the country. In most European democracies, the functions are 
divided between security (domestic) intelligence and foreign intelligence, with the organizations 
doing their tasks wherever necessary, at home or abroad. This division has not been much of an 
issue in most of the new democracies, since the operations they inherited were focused internally 
for the most part. It should be noted that domestic intelligence is cheap in comparison to foreign 
intelligence, and most countries cannot afford to do the latter professionally on a large scale. 
 The third choice new democracies face concerns the relationship between intelligence 
and policy, which logically also involves the matter of coordination among the intelligence 
organizations. At issue is whether all intelligence operations should formally be coordinated by a 
director of central intelligence, as in the United States, but kept separate from the policy-making 
branch (the director is not a member of the president’s Cabinet)? Alternatively, should they stand 
alone, as with MI5 and MI6 in Great Britain, and rely on more collegial coordinating 
procedures? These questions reflect an ongoing debate about the implications for objective 
intelligence analysis when it is closely linked to policy, versus the supposed loss of efficiency by 
having intelligence that is not linked. There are great variations in how different democracies 
handle this issue.34  
 The answer depends in large part on the political traditions and structures of the country, 
but the underlying issue of policy-relevant, but not policy-driven, intelligence must be assessed. 
Critics of covert action in the United States claim that such operations blur the distinction 
between intelligence and policy within the CIA. Rather than simply providing objective 






Hastedt, who has written one of the few books on controlling intelligence, makes his position 
explicit on this issue: “The purpose of intelligence is to inform and warn policy-makers. The 
choice of what to do lies with the policy-maker. If intelligence is brought into too close a contact 
with policy making it runs the risk of being corrupted.”35 In the new democracies, it is too early 
to determine how decision-makers are dealing with this issue, since they are still in the process 
of defining and implementing structures and processes in the (often newly-created) ministries of 
defense and intelligence organizations. Argentina is probably the furthest along in this area, but 
even there the structures are still changing substantially and much policy-making remains 
personality-driven.36 In Brazil, while the head of the Secretariat of Institutional Security, located 
in the office of the president, ostensibly is responsible for advising and coordinating policy, it is 
unclear how far his responsibility extends within the military services and the Federal Police.  
 All three of these decisions hold serious implications for democratic control over 
intelligence. The first choice, about which intelligence functions to fund, will have an obvious 
impact, especially on the scope of counterintelligence operations. Second, the decision whether 
to locate intelligence functions in civilian vs. military structures will directly affect civilian 
control over the armed forces, as well as civilian control over intelligence.  Third, close links 
with policy-making can make intelligence less a function of information gathering and analysis, 
and more a tool used by political leaders to retain power. In the cases with which our research is 
most familiar -- Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Romania, South Africa and South Korea -- the 
evidence suggests that they are dealing well with decisions one and two, but resolution of the 
third remains elusive.  
 
Explicit Mechanisms of Control over Intelligence 
 
 A common mechanism to control intelligence is by separating it into different agencies, 
to prevent any single entity from having a monopoly on its production or use. This is the model 
in the United States. A possible arrangement could be to have separate intelligence organizations 
for each of the armed services and the police, and separate structures for domestic and foreign 
intelligence. This proliferation of organizations might not be the most efficient system, since the 
different agencies tend to battle among themselves over territory and access to decision-makers, 
but it eliminates the chances of monopoly by any single organization or individual, and creates 
opportunities for more democratic control. Most countries that are seeking to reform their 
intelligence structures have moved in this direction. In Argentina, Brazil and Guatemala, the 
governments have created civilian intelligence services -- two each in the case of Brazil and 
Guatemala -- to complement (or compete with?) their military counterparts. Romania is an 
extreme case, however, having created so many smaller, competing and often redundant 
intelligence organizations that maintaining democratic control has become even more difficult. 
 A second mechanism for democratic control is external oversight. Does anyone have 
oversight over intelligence or does the apparatus, and it alone, have responsibility for monitoring 
its own performance? The latter option is extremely dangerous to democracy. In the United 
States, oversight has expanded over time, so that now not only do the intelligence agencies have 
inspector generals, but the executive branch and the two houses of congress also maintain 
oversight bodies.37 Although formal oversight remains very limited in Great Britain, democratic 






is to be under democratic civilian control in countries that are seeking to consolidate their 
democracies, it is clear that the governments must institutionalize oversight.  
 As Marina Caparini notes, executive oversight generally concerns itself with issues of 
efficacy -- whether the intelligence services are functioning efficiently and carrying out their 
assigned tasks. Judicial oversight usually involves issues of propriety and legality. Legislators 
monitor both the efficacy and propriety of intelligence activities, and most new democracies 
emphasize this legislative oversight function. Argentina and Brazil now have legislative 
oversight, but Guatemala does not. Whether these mechanisms in fact work or not, however, 
depends on the composition of the oversight committee and the quantity and quality of its staff. 
Public oversight, mainly a function of the media, usually focuses on issues regarding the 
propriety of intelligence activities.38 
 
Access to the Product  
 
Since knowledge equals power, it is important to specify who may see the intelligence 
and in what form. Is “need-to-know” limited only to the military, or do civilians in the executive 
also have access? What about the legislature? The question of access is a critical one in many 
countries, since democratic elections make it is possible for former opposition elements, even 
guerrillas, to be elected to executive and legislative offices. Countries must establish criteria and 
processes for sharing intelligence with elected officials that will permit informed decision-
making without increasing the likelihood that privileged information will be misused for political 
purposes. This issue is particularly interesting in Brazil, as the president of the legislature’s Joint 
Subcommittee on Intelligence Activities, Deputy Aldo Rebelo, is a member of the Communist 
Party of Brazil, and led a clandestine existence during the previous military regime. From our 
information, it appears that Brazil is developing protocols that will allow officials such Rebelo 
access to intelligence. (Rebelo is now leader of the government party in the lower house, the 
Camara.) Basic questions, such as whether any or all officials “need to know” even before 
operations such as covert actions take place, concerns not just immediate distribution of 
intelligence (which here extends to covert actions as well), but also the general availability of 
information after a certain period of time. The possibility of wider distribution holds implications 
for democratic control of operations. If the intelligence agencies know that in the future their 
files will be open for public scrutiny, they are more likely to keep a rein on the behavior of their 
members.  
 There is a dilemma inherent in the issue of control, and that is the trade-off between 
democratic control over intelligence and the effectiveness of the intelligence apparatus in doing 
its job to defend the nation. This dilemma can be reduced conceptually to the tension between 
accountability, which requires transparency, and the intelligence function, which requires 
secrecy. For example, does legislative oversight result in secrets being leaked and agents being 
uncovered?  Democracies wrestle constantly with this paradox, to which there is no easy or sure 
solution. When discussing legislative oversight in other countries, the issue of the reliability or 
sense of responsibility of legislators always comes up. It is very difficult to make apriori 
judgments on this issue, but it should be noted that since legislative oversight was imposed in the 
United States in the 1970s, there have been far fewer cases of members of Congress or their 






whether to legislate oversight, new democracies must realize the need to grapple with the 
questions of how and by whom oversight should be implemented.  
 One basic problem, paradoxically, is that democratically elected civilians may not in fact 
be interested in controlling the intelligence apparatus in new, unconsolidated democracies. In 
virtually all of these countries, the use of elections to determine leadership is a new and 
relatively fragile means of determining who has power.  Even in old and stable democracies, 
leaders often prefer “plausible deniability” -- the right to claim innocence by ignorance -- rather 
than have access to the information required to control a potentially controversial or dangerous 
organization or operation. Except in a crisis, most politicians in democratic states find little to 
gain by serving on intelligence oversight committees, or involving themselves in routine 
intelligence sector activities that, by their nature, will have little public recognition and therefore 
accrue little political capital. The sad fact is that intelligence sector reforms usually occur only 
when a major scandal is revealed, thus forcing politicians to respond to public outcries that they 
"do something."39 Logically this situation would be even more prevalent in newer democracies 
for at least three reasons. First, politicians may be afraid of antagonizing the intelligence 
apparatus through efforts to control it, because the intelligence organization might have some 
embarrassing information on them hidden away. Second, they may be afraid because the 
intelligence organization in the past engaged in arbitrary and violent actions, and the politicians 
are not sure that a corner has been turned. Third, there are probably no votes to be won in 
attempting to control an organization that most people either don’t know about or want to ignore. 
 In our work at the Center for Civil Military Relations, we have found that democratic 
control of intelligence can be discussed profitably only in those countries that have already 
sorted out the more general issues of civilian control of the military, and have begun to 
institutionalize the structures and processes for this control. In countries that have not yet taken 
these steps, the environment remains too opaque or tense for open discussion of intelligence 
organizations and oversight. Intelligence is by no means the first issue the new civilian 
leadership wants to confront. Before we include the topic of democratic control of intelligence in 
one of our seminar programs, we determine from the U.S. embassy and the ministry of defense 
or joint staff whether it is an appropriate topic for discussion and debate. We have had countries 
threaten to refuse to participate in mixed military-civilian programs when they learn the topic of 
intelligence is to be discussed. We also have had U.S. ambassadors refuse our request to offer a 
program on democratic control of intelligence. On the other hand, Argentina asked us to cover 
this topic in full week seminars that took place in 1998 and 2003, and we have covered it within 
broader seminars in Brazil, Guatemala, Peru and South Africa.  
 
Towards Democratic Control of Intelligence 
 
 Those countries that want to begin to exert democratic civilian control over the 
intelligence apparatus must undertake several tasks. These tasks are similar to those of asserting 
civilian control over the military in general, but are more demanding due to secrecy and the 
penetration of state and society in line with the counterintelligence function.40 Despite the fact 
that they are presented here as a list, the steps that follow are not prioritized, and in fact should 
be pursued simultaneously. They concern civilian competence, public interest and then pressure, 






 The first job is to motivate civilians to learn about intelligence so they can control it. That 
is, government officials needs to demystify intelligence so that it can be both effective and serve 
to defend the nation, under civilian control. In countries that had authoritarian regimes, 
intelligence usually was monopolized by the military, with no role whatsoever for civilians. 
These countries will be unable to control intelligence unless the elected leaders prepare civilians 
to learn enough both to understand what intelligence is all about and to achieve some degree of 
cooperation, if not respect, from the intelligence professionals. The effort should begin with a 
formal and public commitment by the executive branch of government to review the entire 
intelligence structure, with the goal of establishing a new policy. This has been done in 
Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and South Africa, thanks primarily to the social bargain that results 
from the transition to democracy.  
 The government’s commitment to reform must also create openings for civilian 
employment in intelligence. As in civil-military relations in general, civilians will have no 
motivation to come forward unless they can anticipate viable careers in the field. They can then 
begin to learn about intelligence by reading the unclassified literature from different countries 
and taking advantage of cooperative training arrangements in intelligence offered by other 
governments such as that of the United States. In addition to bilateral programs, it also makes 
sense to establish regional programs, in which members are able to share their insights and 
further develop their common fund of knowledge. Regional intelligence sharing programs can be 
one positive, and likely, result.  
 The second, broader, task is to encourage a political culture that supports the legitimate 
role of intelligence in a democracy, but does not allow it to run rampant. James A. Schlesinger 
noted, “to preserve secrecy, especially in a democracy, security must be part of an accepted 
pattern of behavior outside of government and inside.”41 The responsibility for making the 
system work must go in both directions: from the intelligence community to those 
democratically elected civilians who maintain oversight, to provide complete information as and 
when directed; and from civilian officials to the intelligence community -- and society in general 
-- not to release classified information for personal or political reasons. This culture can be 
encouraged, as with democratic civil-military relations in general, by fostering a public debate 
that will break through the residual apathy or fear within the population regarding intelligence. In 
some older democracies, including Canada, France, Great Britain and the United States, this 
debate is stimulated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the media fairly regularly, 
and periodically dramatized by intelligence fiascoes that become public. The role of the media in 
maintaining oversight is crucial, and their awareness of intelligence concerns can be encouraged 
in the same manner as with the public. Elected politicians’ commitment to establish a policy on 
intelligence can act as a salutary catalyst to this society-wide debate.  
 Such a discussion has been initiated in a few of the newer democracies. The December 
1996 Peace Accords in Guatemala, between the government and opposition guerrilla 
organizations, stipulate in several sections that intelligence will be transformed and put under 
civilian oversight. These commitments have led to public seminars on intelligence, publications 
by NGOs, and articles in the newspapers.42 In Argentina, the debate was initiated by a small 
number of civilians who realized that democratic consolidation requires civilian control over 
intelligence.43 And in November 2002 the Brazilian Congress held an open two-day conference 






attendees including co-author Bruneau, and extensive media coverage. The public discussion of 
the role of intelligence in democracy serves a number of important functions. Demythologizing 
intelligence allows outsiders more realistically to assess its necessity and value for a country; 
creates legitimate space for civilians who want to become intelligence specialists; and puts 
pressure on the government to make its functions more transparent. Several international NGOs 
(the Federation of American Scientists or the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the 
Armed Forces, for example) are very willing to assist other countries in generating this debate.44   
 The third task is not about civilians or the public in general, but concerns the selection, 
training, and overall preparation of the state’s intelligence professionals. The focus on 
intelligence as a profession is particularly apt since its members, more than any other type of 
specialist, are constrained more by professional norms than outside controls (such as oversight), 
even in a democracy.45 While the armed forces are regulated by budgets, promotions, and a 
myriad of civilian control mechanisms, intelligence professionals are controlled only in the last 
analysis, if that, by the external structures and processes noted above. They are granted impunity 
to break laws abroad and have tremendous leeway to bend laws within their own country and 
organization. They operate secretly outside the system of checks and balances, they are 
ensconced in a bureaucracy with other like-minded officers and develop a closed-club mentality, 
and they are very suspicious of outsiders, including at times their own superiors. In new 
democracies, where accountability is minimal in any case, the impunity of the intelligence 
services from the consequences of their actions is a given.  
 
Intelligence as a Profession  
  
 Like all professions, intelligence can be defined in terms of the three criteria of expertise, 
corporateness and responsibility.46 The first criterion, expertise, encompasses the four 
intelligence functions of collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. While the 
range of what intelligence professionals do is extremely broad, what unifies them, or defines 
them as intelligence professionals, is secrecy. (The military profession also has elements of 
secrecy, but these pertain mainly to intelligence.) With regard to covert actions, prominent 
American intelligence specialist Richard M. Bissell Jr. emphasizes both the diversity of 
intelligence operatives, and secrecy as their defining characteristic: 
 
The professional competence of a clandestine service consists of, and is measured 
by, its ability to carry out operations secretly (or deniably), much as lawyers’ 
competence consists in their ability to win cases, and doctors’ in their ability to 
prevent or treat illness. The clandestine service may number among its members 
brilliant journalists, able warriors, and superior political analysts, but the 
professional skill for which, presumably, they are hired is the ability to organize 
and conduct operations covertly. This is a rather specialized skill not widely 
found outside of intelligence and internal security services.47 
 
 Second, an intelligence service’s corporateness lies in its access to secret systems, 
documents, information, sources and operations. Clearances are the control mechanism for entry 






requirements for intelligence professionals, or even among different intelligence organizations 
within one country, and little defines their corporate identity beyond their access to classified 
information.48 The security clearances and the work done together in secret on secret information 
and projects reinforce a deliberate culture of identification as a member of a unique, even elite, 
club. It may also breed a dangerous level of arrogance, including a sense of impunity -- if 
nobody else knows what really going on, then how can “outsiders” control those who do? 
Furthermore, how can those same outsiders presume to judge the value of the product, or the 
effectiveness of operations, when they don’t have access to all the facts? 
 Third, the responsibility of the intelligence professional is to serve in defense of the 
democratic state. But if we consider the first two criteria of expertise in secret matters and a 
corporate culture based on security clearances, we are led inexorably to the view of intelligence 
as a profession that largely governs itself, according to its own definition of responsibility. In 
new democracies this is doubly serious, not only because the previous regime was not 
accountable to the general population, but further, intelligence officers may not even have been 
responsible to the small group controlling the state. This legacy begs the question, who should 
know what, and who is in control? An institutionalized ethos of responsibility is extremely 
important to democracy, and even in stable democracies enough incidents of wrongdoing come 
to light to cause concern that intelligence officers may not be serving the state. Or rather, they 
are serving it in their limited organizational terms and not those of the democratically elected 
leaders. In new democracies this situation is all the more difficult and destabilizing, due to the 
fact that there is no tradition within the intelligence community of responsibility to the 
democratic state, and the process of building professionalism, as we have defined it here, will be 
problematic at best.  
 
To Change a Profession 
 
 It is clear that major efforts must be taken in the new democracies to promote and 
inculcate a sense of professional responsibility by making intelligence officers and agencies 
answerable to the state via its democratically elected leaders. This can be accomplished only by 
committing serious attention and resources to recruitment and training, and by obligating the 
services to remain involved in the larger polity and society. The specific elements of this 
prescription have to be defined separately for each nation.  
 One of the greatest obstacles is the tendency of governments to recruit retired military 
personnel into civilian intelligence positions. These former officers may have taken off their 
uniforms, but their attitudes and loyalties tend to remain what they were during their military 
careers. If new personnel cannot be found, the question becomes whether retired military officers 
will be able -- and willing -- to shift their ethic of responsibility from their former organization to 
the state. In most countries, including the older democracies, there is little explicit attention paid 
to promoting this ethic of service to the state within the intelligence community.49 In the older 
democracies there is less need to promote the ethic, as it is a generally embraced societal norm. 
In the newer democracies, however, the need is clear, and goes along with the need for an open 
debate on intelligence, and the active recruitment of civilians into the field.50  
A practical problem in reforming intelligence activities involves the organizational 






intelligence agencies is that the transformation process will leave the nation vulnerable to both 
internal and external threats. In most organizations, a radical transformation process will 
inherently involve a period of declining organizational task efficiency. One goal during the 
transformation process is to limit this decline while minimizing the time it takes for the 
organization to recover. As a high level South African official described it, a dilemma arises 
when the organizational level of efficiency reaches a lower plateau and seems to stagnate, rather 
than improve to the level of the old organization. A common reaction to this problem is to 
attempt to reorganize further in order to improve efficiency (or as one long-time intelligence 
officer suggested, to increase managerial control over the organization). The result usually is 
another decline in organizational task efficiency as the agency struggles to adapt to these new 
changes. The problem can become systemic if the agency’s leadership does not recognize it and 
allow the organization sufficient time to adapt and gradually recover efficiency. Figure 4 
illustrates this dilemma.  
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The first critical point of divergence occurs at the new organizational level of efficiency 
(C). Management expects to see improvements in efficiency along a gradual slope toward a 
desired level (X), when instead the organization seems stuck at the lower efficiency. When 
improvement does not occur in the expected timely manner, there is a tendency to reorganize 
(D), thus leading to another decline in efficiency (slope D-E) and another reorganization (E). 
Obviously, this can become a self-defeating process for a consolidating democracy attempting to 





 All nations engage in intelligence activities on some scale. Most leaders believe they 
must do so because other countries do, and no government can afford to be ignorant of what is 
going on outside and inside its territory and society. Furthermore, leaders must be prepared, if 
necessary, to counter other states’ efforts to influence developments in their country. After the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been renewed emphasis on the need for effective 
and efficient intelligence services, along with greater attention to non-state actors. In most of the 
world, however, the legacy of intelligence services that supported authoritarian regimes has been 
extremely detrimental to democracy. In the midst of today’s challenges to democratic 
consolidation, efforts to ensure democratic control over intelligence are both necessary and 
extremely difficult. Without decisive action the intelligence apparatus will remain a state within 
a state and prevent democratic consolidation. In many countries, however, there is virtually no 
public recognition of this fact. Like all else in civil-military relations, transformation will require 
continual efforts on the part of civilians and intelligence professionals to achieve the most 
appropriate balance of efficiency and transparency for the country. A small but significant group 
of countries has undertaken to reform their intelligence systems and to foster a healthy public 
debate over their future. This is an area in which international assistance is available, and on 
which there is a limited but rapidly increasing body of useful literature. 
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